By Konstantinos K
International Relations have been a diverse and pluralistic discipline of political science that has not had a sole and universally accepted theory on how the international realm should be understood. On the contrary, the plethora of approaches and their core assumptions can be seen as acting supplementary to each other, enriching, therefore, the collective body of International Relations Theory, through an intra-disciplinary clash of different and sometimes contrasting hypotheses and separate theories. In this article, however, I will focus solely on the realist tradition and two closely related approaches that can be found in it. Firstly, I shall present an overview of structural realism and then proceed with offensive realism by expanding on the assumptions and theory of structural realism. In order to exemplify the two theories’ main hypotheses in the global system, two news articles will be used for each one respectively.
The realist tradition, also known as Realpolitik, is regarded to be the first organized theory of International Relations with remarkably widespread use by IR thinkers (Donnelly, 2013: 32). Classical realist thinkers that have provided the bedrock of theory for the tradition’s evolution into the 20th century up until today include prominent German émigré scholar, Hans J. Morgenthau (Dunne and Schmidt, 2017: 106) and thinkers such as historian E. H. Carr (Donnelly, 2013: 33) among others. It is on the foundational work of those figures that neo-realist; Kenneth N. Waltz builds upon to construct his theory of structural realism that focuses on the absence of an international world government (anarchy) as well as the core assumption that states employ self-help means to pursue their own interests in the context of anarchy (Waltz, 1979:107). States are also fearful of each other as uncertainty prevails in the anarchical system worldwide and no state unit can be totally sure about the others’ intentions (Mearsheimer, 2014: 31). Following this assumption and taking into consideration that survival is each State’s ultimate goal, per realism (Dunne and Schmidt, 2017: 110-111) one is in a position to apprehend why state behaviour is driven by such rationality and caution (Mearsheimer, 2014: 31). This structural understanding of realism, as exemplified above, was introduced by Kenneth Waltz. Having deemed the assumptions that humanity is inherently selfish and “bad” and the follow-up argument that States are thus consequently flawed too as partially insufficient to fully explain the causes of war and conflict, he regards them as essential but incomplete without a structural explanation (Waltz, 2001: 238). Hence, structural realism is born via contrasting its initial hypotheses, presented in Waltz’s third image regarding the international system (2001: 159) with classical realism’s core body of theory and assumptions about human nature.
In order to better apprehend the essence of structural realism in action, I am going to briefly analyse and present a news article that can exemplify the main arguments brought forward by Waltz regarding the anarchical structure of the international system and the states’ behaviour in it. The article’s focus is the potential great power competition in the arctic zone, which no state has control of as of now. Titled “The Return of Great Power Competition to the Arctic”, author Abhishek Saxena argues that the “grey” status of the Arctic and its supposed exceptionality are being completely disregarded by Russia, China and the USA who purport to gain control over the area in their pursuit for power (Saxena, 2020). This case highlights the fact that when anarchy prevails and no overarching authority exists to contain and mediate crises over conflicting national interests of rival powers as in the present case, states can be driven to a potential conflict over unclaimed territory (per this example).
Another closely related theory of structural realism that offers an alternative view of great power competition and can also be regarded as a more or less descriptive and also prescriptive theory of IR, is Mearsheimer’s offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2014: 11). Great powers, per offensive realism, seek to disturb the existing balance of power and status quo by trying to shift the power balance to their favour when such an opportunity arises to maximize their power (2014: 34). In Mearsheimer’s theory, there are only three factors that constitute the causes for state behaviour. These are the absence of a central authority (as in the case of Kenneth N. Waltz’s defensive realism), the always present relative military power of each state and finally the uncertainty over states’ intentions and agendas. Military prowess and power is central in offensive realism as it is regarded to be the currency of the international system (2014: 55). Therefore great powers purport to constantly maximize it so as to overcome their potential rivals and the road to becoming a hegemonic power in the global system. Mearsheimer shares Waltz’s assumption that survival is the state’s ultimate goal but adds that great powers can only secure survival by becoming the most powerful state in the system, under the doctrine that the best defence is "attack" (2014:35). When a state does not use this opportunity to grab power and become a global hegemon it enables its rivals to reach a relatively same level of military power. Therefore, in order not to put its survival in jeopardy, a great power needs to act pre-emptively so as to secure global hegemony. Mearsheimer, however, also recognizes that such actions can provoke another great power to “strike back” in order to preserve the existing balance of power if the status quo is deemed beneficial for it.
An article that exemplifies offensive realism’s core ideas was published in “Foreign Affairs” magazine under the title “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s fault”. In it, Mearsheimer argues that the annexation of Crimea by Russia can be perfectly explained as a result of Western and more specifically US’s and NATO’s expansionist moves that jeopardized Russian national security (2014:77). Putin acted in response to these moves to counter-balance the Western “aggression”, in his view, and by seizing the Crimea peninsula he cancels any potential plans for housing a NATO naval base there in the future. Mearsheimer also attributes the West’s failure to contain the crisis to false faith in liberal worldviews regarding IR and makes the point that realism is still relevant in current world affairs (2014: 78).
To sum up, one can see both theories’ worldviews that exist in the realist tradition. Also, the articles were chosen clearly reflect the two worldviews presented by two very esteemed scholars, such as Kenneth N. Waltz and John Mearsheimer. For many realism presents a very dim and pessimistic outlook of international politics since the hypothesis that war and conflict are endemic lies at the core of the realist school of thought. It is, however, this particular pessimistic attitude and point of view that has made realism one of the most influential theories of international relations worldwide. Realist explanations of war and conflict are by far much more illustrating and enlightening than any other approach's view. It is also realism's cynical simplicity in explaining the inherently "bad" nature of mankind and tendency towards violence that has rewarded the realist much notoriety and admittedly criticism. John Mearsheimer, the founder of offensive realist had proclaimed that even if warfare and weapons did not exist, mankind would still find ways to be violent and make war. After all, he writes, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it.
Bibliography:
Baylis J., Smith, S., Owens, P. (2017) The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burchill, S., Devetak R., Donnelly, J., Linklater, A., Paterson, M., Nardin, T., Reus-Smit, C. and True, J. (2013). Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mearsheimer, J. (2014). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W Norton & Company, Inc.
Mearsheimer, J. (2014) Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault. [Accessed 12.11.2020]
Saxena, A. (2020) The Return of Great Power Competition to the Arctic. The Arctic Institute. Available at https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/return-great-power-competition-arctic/?cn-reloaded=1. [Accessed 12.11.2020]
Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: MacGraw-Hill.
Waltz, K. N. (2001) Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press.
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